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Abstract
We consider a problem of secure communications for the communication system consisting of multiple inputs for a
source and a relay and multiple outputs for the relay, a destination and an eavesdropper. For the above-mentioned
communication system, we establish a lower bound on the secrecy capacity at which secure communications
between the source and the destination are attainable. We make use of the singular value decomposition (SVD) and
its generalization to decompose the whole system into parallel independent channels. At the source, the generalized
singular value decomposition (GSVD) is performed to simultaneously diagonalize the channel matrices of the relay
and the destination and independently code across the resulting parallel channels. At the relay, the SVD is performed
to beamform the signal towards the destination. The scalar case of what we are considering in this article has been
investigated in previous literature, to prove that the introduction of a fourth party, the relay, in the wire-tap channel
facilitates secure wireless communications. Our simulation results are in line with the scalar case’s and prove to be
successful in achieving secrecy capacity where the conventional model failed, i.e., when no relay is introduced and the
eavesdropper’s channel incurs as little noise as the legitimate receiver.
1 Introduction
Wireless communications are prone to eavesdropping
by nature: it is inevitable for electromagnetic waves
propagated over the public medium to be subject to
wire-tapping from an unwanted party, which makes the
security one of the biggest challenges for the wireless
community to ever encounter. However, owing to cryp-
tography, wireless applications gained trust in the market.
For instance, cryptosystems are deployed to prevent
the computing power-limited enemy from causing any
threat. Nevertheless, today the statement about this limi-
tation is being regarded as a somehow strong assumption
amid technological advances in computing technologies.
Hence, the blink future of this kind of security and the
need for the focus on security methods that drop this
unrealistic assumption.
When introducing the brilliant notion of information-
theoretic security [1], Shannon, the father of information
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theory, established the condition for a secure commu-
nication between legitimate parties to succeed: when an
eavesdropper is no better informed about the transmit
messages after intercepting them than he was before. By
bringing the channel uncertainty into play, Wyner intro-
duced the wire-tap channel [2] where he gave a new form
of the condition for perfect secrecy, when the eavesdrop-
per’s equivocation about a message is equal to the entropy
of the latter. For this to happen, the eavesdropper was
assumed to incur a degraded version of the legitimate
channel. From Wyner’s model spanned many studies that
characterized the secrecy capacity of diﬀerent channel
models, namely the extension to the Gaussian channel [3],
the broadcast channel [4] and the recent multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) channel [5].
Among studies to address the security issue in a relay-
network scenario are [6-9]. In [6,7], the authors address
the problem of securing a communication, between a
sender and a receiver assisted by a relay, from the relay
itself. In [8,9], the limits to the Gaussian wire-tap model
in ensuring secure communications were pushed further
by the introduction of a relay in the communication
system. The fourth party proved to be a key component in
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establishing a secure link between the source and the des-
tination even when the latter’s channel is as noisy as the
eavesdropper’s. Our work here is also motivated by the
fact that the MIMO wire-tap model is also insecure when
the eavesdropper incurs as little noise as the destination.
The behavior of the above deﬁned model following the
introduction of a multi-antenna relay is to be analyzed in
this article.
The generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)
will serve as a precoding technique in the model under
investigation as did the singular value decomposition
(SVD) for the Gaussian MIMO channel in [10]. While
the SVD decomposes a system comprising a pair of
sender/receiver into parallel independent sub-channels,
the GSVD decomposes a system comprising one sender
and two receivers. Although in [10] it has been proved
that the SVD-based precoding technique achieves capac-
ity, proving the same for the GSVD in our model is beyond
the scope of this article. GSVD precoding at the source
in conjunction with SVD precoding at the relay allows for
the transmitter (source and relay) to beamform the signals
towards the legitimate receivers (relay and destination),
thus providing the latter with an advantage over the eaves-
dropper in the reception. That being done, it becomes
straightforward to transfer results from the scalar case
[8,9] and thus extend the proof, to the MIMO case, that a
relay-assisted communication achieves secrecy when the
conventional scheme fails.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the system model and give a brief state-
ment about the GSVD and the secrecy capacity of the
Gaussian relay wire-tap channel. Our results are derived
in Section 3 and analyzed in Section 4 by computer simu-
lations. Finally, we conclude our study in Section 5.
Notations: For a given matrix A, trace(A), null(A), and
rank(A) denote the trace, the null space and the rank,
respectively. The superscript ⊥ denotes the orthogonal
complement of a subspace. Finally, [x]+ is the maximum
between x and 0.
2 Systemmodel and preliminaries
2.1 Channel model
The MIMO relay wire-tap channel is depicted in Figure 1.
The source is assumed to have Ns transmit antennas. For
simplicity, the relay has the same number of transmit and
receive antennas, Nr . The destination as well as the pas-
sive eavesdropper are assumed to have Nd and Ne receive
antennas, respectively. The relaying strategy is the decode
and forward (DF) scheme. The above-deﬁned channel can
be modeled by the following system of equations:
Yr = H1Xs + Zr
Yd = H2Xs + H4Xr + Zd (1)
Ye = H3Xs + H5Xr + Ze
Figure 1 Systemmodel.
where
• Xi ∈ CNi×1, Xi ∼ N (0,Qi), trace(XiX†i ) ≤ Pi,
i = s, r, respectively, is the source transmit signal,
relay transmit signal, respectively.
• Yr ∈ CNr×1, Yd ∈ CNd×1, and Ye ∈ CNe×1 are the
received signals at the relay, destination and
eavesdropper nodes, respectively.
• H1 ∈ CNr×Ns ,H2 ∈ CNd×Ns ,H3 ∈ CNe×Ns ,
H4 ∈ CNd×Nr , andH5 ∈ CNe×Nr are the
complex-valued channel gain matrices as depicted in
Figure 1.
• Zr ∈ CNr×1, Zd ∈ CNd×1, and Ze ∈ CNe×1 are
independent complex Gaussian noise vectors with
distribution CN (0, Iσ 2r ), CN (0, Iσ 2d ), and
CN (0, Iσ 2e ), respectively.
2.2 Problem statement
The source wishes to communicate with the destina-
tion. The relay takes part in the communication process
by relaying data from the source to the destination. We
assume the relay’s channel to be less noisier than the
destination’sa. Meanwhile, we do not exclude the case
where a successful communication is feasible in the direct
link (from source to destination). A question that arises
here is: Why do we need a relay anyway?
To answer this question, we highlight the primary role
of the relay in our model. The third legitimate party was
not introduced for a primary goal to ﬁll his traditional role
[11] (to guarantee a successful communication when the
direct link is too noisy to serve, alone), but to guarantee
a secure communication when the direct link is compro-
mised by eavesdropping. It has been proved that the relay
assumes this new role in the scalar case [8]. Our goal here
is to prove so for the MIMO case.
2.3 Generalized singular value decomposition
Due to the use of the GSVD [12] in subsequent sections,
it is convenient to introduce it, ﬁrst, for a given H1
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Simply put, if we consider a sender S and two receivers
R1 and R2 (with channel matrices H1 and H2 of (1))
as in Figure 2, then four independent input sets can be
distinguished. S1 is the set of inputs that, if sent by S,
lies simultaneously in the raw space of H1 and the null
space of H2. S2 is analogous and thus straightforward
to infer. S12 is the set of inputs that lies in the raw
spaces of H1 and H2 simultaneously. Finally, transmit-
ting a subset from Sn reaches neither R1 nor R2 since
it lies simultaneously in the null spaces of H1 and H2.
Thus, by carefully designing a codeword to be the sum-
mation of elements from the four deﬁned sets in (2), the
communication system is decomposed into parallel inde-
pendent virtual channels: the private (unicast) channel
to R1, the private channel to R2, the common (broad-
cast) channel to both R1 and R2 and the fourth channel
to any receiver but R1 and R2. Letting |A| denotes the
cardinality of a set A, we deﬁne s1  |S1|, s2  |S2|,
s12  |S12|, and sn  |Sn|. Intuitively, s1, s2, and s12
are the number of unicast channels to the relay, uni-
cast channels to the destination and broadcast channels,
respectively.
Deﬁnition 1. For a given H1 and H2 as deﬁned above,











where 1 ∈ CNr×Nr , 2 ∈ CNd×Nd , and  ∈ CNs×Ns are






s2 0 0 0
s12 0 D1 0







s2 I 0 0
s12 0 D2 0
s1 0 0 0
⎞
⎠ (6)
are diagonal with real and strictly positive diagonal entries
D1 = diag(r1, . . . , rs12) (7)
D2 = diag(e1, . . . , es12) (8)
To describe it in an intuitive manner, the GSVD decom-
poses a system comprising a sender and two receivers into
parallel independent channels, which can then be encoded






it follows that k = s1 + s2 + s12.
Table 1 indicates how s1, s2, s12, and sn vary with dif-
ferent conﬁgurations for the full-rank pencil (H1,H2), i.e.,
the dimensions Ns, Nr , and Nd. Surprisingly, the four sub-
spaces does not coexist for any given conﬁguration. Data
in Table 1 may be represented in a more compact form as
follows:
s12 = max (0,min ((Nr + Nd) ,Ns))
s1 = Nr − s12
s2 = Nd − s12
sn = max (0,Ns − (Nr + Nd))













Figure 2 GSVD-based precoding.
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Table 1 s1, s2, s12, sn for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the full-rank pencil (H1,H2)
Scenario Conﬁguration s12 s1 s2 sn
1 Nr + Nd < Ns 0 Nr Nd Ns − (Nr + Nd)
2 Nr + Nd = Ns 0 Nr Nd 0
3 max(Nr ,Nd) < Ns < Nr + Nd (Nr + Nd) − Ns Ns − Nd Ns − Nr 0
4 Nd < Ns ≤ Nr Nd Nr − Nd 0 0
5 Nr < Ns ≤ Nd Nr 0 Nd − Nr 0
6 Ns ≤ min(Nr ,Nd) Ns 0 0 0
2.4 Lower bound on the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian
relay wire-tap channel
A lower bound on the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian
relay wire-tap channel is expressed as [9]
Rs ≥ [min {I(Xs;Yr|Xr), I(Xs,Xr ;Yd)} − I(Xs,Xr ;Ye)]+
(11)
where Xs and Xr are the source and relay transmit sig-
nals. Yr , Yd, and Ye are the received signals at the relay, the
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively.
3 Secrecy rate for the GaussianMIMO relay
wire-tap channel
In the following, we derive a lower bound on the secrecy
capacity for the Gaussian MIMO relay wire-tap chan-
nel described by the system model in (1). The idea is to
decompose the whole system into parallel independent
channels, making it easy to transmit over interference-free
virtual channels. The duration of communicating a code-
word spans two time slots, with the beginning of a next
communication interleaving with the end of a previous
one. For that, the destination needs to split his antennas
(not physically) into two groups, for the reception from
the source and the relay. Following this communication
scheme, only Scenarios 3 and 4 arise as feasible ones. In
Scenarios 1 and 2, the receiver exploits all its antennas for
the reception from the source. Thus, no further antennas
are spared for the second time slot (reception from the
relay). Hence, these two scenarios are infeasible. In Sce-
narios 5 and 6, since s12 = 0 (i.e., no private channel exists
between the source and the relay), relaying cooperation
cannot be applied. Finally, in both Scenarios 3 and 4, we
assume that the destination’s channel is knowledgeable to
the source and the relay. We also assume that the source
has perfect knowledge of the relay’s channel.
3.1 Scenario 3
The communication scheme is described in Table 2 and
further illustrated in Figure 3. The source node performs
















. The source, then
chooses Xs as the sum of the information-bearing signals
to the relay Xsr and the destination Xsd.
Xsr ∈ S1
Xsd ∈ S2
Xs = Xsr + Xsd (14)
The source pre-multiplies Xs by I before injecting
it into the channel. The average power constraint at the
sender is satisﬁed by













Yr = H1IXs + Zr
(a)= rr
[Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsr + Zr (18)
Table 2 Scenario 3 communication scheme
Step Source Relay
1 performs a GSVD of (H1,H2)
2 performs a GSVD-based precoding
to construct codewords that con-
veymessages towards the relay and
the destination over their respec-
tive private channels
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Figure 3 Scenario 3 communication scheme.
In (a) Xsd is nulled out by the relay’s channel since it lies
on null(H1). The relay relaying strategy is the DF. Thus,
the relay decodes Xsr from Yr and encodes it into
Xr ∈ S12. (19)
then performs an SVD ofH4,
H4 = UrdrdV†rd (20)
and pre-multiplies Xr by Vrd before injecting it into the






At the destination and the eavesdroppper’s sides, by
combining (1), (13), (14), (19), and (20), their respective
received signals reads
Yd = H2IXs + H4VrdXr + Zd
(b)= dd
[Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsd + UrdrdXr + Zd
(22)
Ye = H3IXs + H5VrdXr + Ze
= H3IXsr + H3IXsd + H5VrdXr + Ze (23)
In (b)Xsr is nulled out by the destination’s channel since it
lies on null(H2). Since the destination receives the signals
from the source and the relay over independent channels
(because of the orthogonality of the source and the relay
channels), (22) can be written as:
Ysd = dd
[Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsd + Zd (24)
Yrd = UrdrdXrd + Zd (25)
The destination processes his received signal in (24)




Then, the equations in (18), (24), and (25) become
Y˜r = r
[Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsr + Z˜r (26)
Y˜sd = d
[Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsd + Z˜d (27)
Y˜rd = rdXrd + Z˜d (28)
where Z˜r = †r Zr and Z˜d = †dZd Summing (27) and (28)
yields
Y˜d = d
[ Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsd + rdXrd + Z˜d (29)




Y˜r = rMSnXsr + Z˜r (31)
Y˜d = dMSnXsd + rdXrd + Z˜d (32)
Now secrecy capacity (11) is bounded below by
Csec(Ps,Pr) ≥ [min {A,B} − C]+ (33)
where A = I(Xs;Yr|Xr), B = I(Xs,Xr ;Yd) and C =
I(Xs,Xr ;Ye).
Straightforward calculations result in











I(Xs,Xr ;Ye) = 12 log|I + Se| (36)
where
Se = HseIQsr†I†H†se + HseIQsd†I†H†se
+ HreVrdQrdV†rdH†re (37)
3.2 Scenario 4
The communication scheme is described in Table 3 and
further illustrated in Figure 4. The source node performs












Xs ∈ S1 (40)
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Table 3 Scenario 4 communication scheme
Step Source Relay
1 performs a GSVD of (H1,H2)
2 performs a GSVD-based precod-
ing to construct a codeword that
conveys the messages towards
the relay over his respective pri-
vate channels
3 performs an SVD-based
precoding to beamform
the message towards the
destination
The source pre-multiplies Xs by I before injecting







The relay node performs an SVD ofH4,
H4 = UrdrdV†rd (42)
then chooses
Xr ∈ S12 (43)
The relay pre-multiplies Xr by Vrd before injecting it







Combining (1), (38), (39), (40), (42), and (43) yields
Yr = H1IXs + Zr
= rr
[Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xs + Zr (45)
Yd = H2IXs + H4VrdXr + Zd
(d)= UrdrdXr + Zd (46)
Ye = H3IXs + H5VrdXr + Ze
= H3IXs + H5VrdXr + Ze (47)
Figure 4 Scenario 4 communication scheme.
In (d) Xs is nulled out by the relay’s channel since it lies
on null(H2).
The relay processes his received signal (45) by multiply-
ing it by †r .
The destination processes his received signal in (46) by
multiplying it by U†rd.
Then, the equations in (45) and (46) become
Y˜r = r
[ Ik×k 0k×(Ns−k)]Xsr + Z˜r (48)
Y˜d = rdXrd + Z˜d (49)
where Z˜r = †r Zr and Z˜d = U†rdZd.
By substituting (30) in (48)
Y˜r = rMSnXsr + Z˜r (50)
Now secrecy capacity (11) is bounded below by (33).
Straightforward calculations result in





I(Xs,Xr ;Yd) = 12 log|I + rdQrd
†
rd| (52)
I(Xs,Xr ;Ye) = 12 log|I + Se| (53)
where
Se = H3IQs†I†H†3 + H5VrdQrdV†rdH†5 (54)
4 Simulation results
In this section, we convey the secure communication
performance of the proposed scheme by running two
Table 4 Simulation settings
Figure 5 Figure 6
Number of antennas
Ns 8, 4 8
Nr 6, 3 6
Nd 4, 2 4
Ne 4, 2 4
Noise variances
σ 2r 1 1
σ 2d 10 10, 5
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 : Conventional Model, (8,4,4)&(4,2,2)
Figure 5 Scenario 3’s secrecy rate of the MIMO relay wire-tap channel and MIMOwire-tap channel, versus SNR: diﬀerent antennas
conﬁgurations (Ns,Nr ,Nd ,Ne) and (Ns,Nd ,Ne).
simulations. We compare our results to the MIMO wire-
tap channel’s, with no relay brought into play. We refer to
it henceforth as the conventional model. The key to out-
performance of one scheme over another is the secrecy
rate achieved between the source and the destination.
We adopt for simplicity the equal power allocation
strategy for transmission, although a optimal power allo-
cation scheme may further contribute to achieve secrecy.
In all simulations, the simulation settings in Table 4 are
captured from situations where the conventional scheme
yields secrecy rates equal to zero. To this end, the eaves-
dropper’s channel needs to incur the same level of noise
as the destination’s (σ 2d = σ 2e ). Then we compute, for the
same settings, the secrecy rate of our proposed scheme.
We assume the relay to enjoy a better channel than the
destination’s (σ 2r < σ 2d ).

































 : Conventional Model, σ
e
2=5,10
Figure 6 Scenario 3’s secrecy rate of the MIMO relay wire-tap channel and MIMOwire-tap channel, versus SNR: diﬀerent noise values.
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In Figure 5, the achievable secrecy rates of the conven-
tional and proposed schemes are plotted for two antenna
conﬁgurations. The secrecy rates of the former remain
null for all the source-destination SNR values while the
latter yields positive ones. Since the destination’s channel
impairments are the same as those of the eavesdropper’s
(σ 2d = σ 2e ), the latter understands the channel output as
much as the former does. Thus there is no rate such that
a secure communication in the direct link can occur. Our
scheme guarantees, thanks to the better channel that the
relay enjoys, a certain secrecy rate. It is obvious that, by
increasing the number of antennas for all parties, capac-
ity increases, so does secrecy capacity. Hence the better
secrecy level attained from the red curve than the blue
one.
In Figure 6, the achievable secrecy rates of the conven-
tional and proposed schemes are plotted for two channel
impairments at the destination (σ 2d ) and the eavesdropper
(σ 2e ). The secrecy rates of the former remain null for all
the source-destination SNR values while the latter yields
positive ones. Here also, we get two secrecy levels for two
noise levels at the eavesdropper. That is because the nois-
ier the eavesdropper’s channel, the better secrecy results
are.
5 Conclusion
In this article, the problem of securing a communica-
tion between a source and a destination with the help
of a relay against a passive eavesdropper was considered.
We referred to this model as the MIMO relay wire-tap
channel for which a closed form of the secrecy rate was
derived. The key step to this result was a combination
of SVD and GSVD to decompose the whole system into
parallel independent channels, which allowed the source
to beamform the communication simultaneously towards
the relay and the destination and the relay to beamform
the signal towards the destination, thus providing the
legitimate parties with an advantages in the reception over
the eavesdropper. The proposed model outperforms the
MIMO wire-tap channel with no relay assistance, when
the eavesdropper’s channel incurs as little noise as the des-
tination’s. This emphasizes the importance of cooperation
in achieving secrecy. Future studies in this subject will be
the enhancing of secrecy by deriving and adopting the
optimal power allocation scheme.
Endnotes
aIt should be noted that the case when the relay’s channel
is noisier than that of the destination’s is trivial and need-
less to mention. This is because, as demonstrated in [11],
the introduction of the relay (with a noisier channel than
the destination’s) has no beneﬁt in enhancing the capacity
between the source and the destination.
bWe note that we particularly performed the GSVD on
the pencil (H1,H2) and not on (H1,H3) or (H2,H3) (the
pencils containing the eavesdropper’s channel). This is
because in doing one of the latter GSVD decompositions,
we need to assume that the source has perfect knowl-
edge of the eavesdropper’s channel, which may not be
available in many cases in real-world scenarios. However,
for readers interested in a study that considered a pen-
cil containing the eavesdropper’s channel, [13] is a good
reference.
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